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Recent Decisions
which have juvenile statutes similar to Alaska's, the protection af-
forded the accused is immeasurable.
Frank A. Fisher, Jr.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION-"PLAIN-MEANING RULE"-EQUAL PAY
LAw-The Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that an employer
is entitled, in order to comply with the Equal Pay Law as it read
prior to 1968, to lower the wage rates of male employees to a point
equal to those of female employees against whom it has discrimi-
nated. Although subsequent statutory amendments have rendered
the case moot substantively, the court's reliance upon the "plain-
meaning" rule of statutory construction remains significant.
Daugherty v. Continental Can Co., 226 Pa. Super. 342, 313 A.2d
276 (1973).
Rules of statutory interpretation have been developed throughout
our judicial history in recognition of the relationship between the
courts and the legislatures. The concept of separation of powers
limits the court's ability to "usurp" the power of the legislature by
disregarding or distorting the legislative intent expressed in statu-
tory enactments. The rules deal generally with the meaning of sta-
tutory language, the use of extrinsic materials as interpretive aids,
and the presumptions for ascertaining legislative intent.'
One often expressed rule relating to the use of extrinsic materials
to aid interpretation was announced by the United States Supreme
Court when it stated that the duty of interpretation does not arise
when the language admits of no more than one meaning.2 This ex-
pression of the so-called "plain-meaning" rule has been echoed in
different forms by courts throughout the United States3 and has
1. Horack, The Disintegration of Statutory Construction, 24 IND. L.J. 335, 337 (1949)
[hereinafter cited as Horack].
2. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). "Where the language is plain and
admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules
which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion."
3. See, e.g., Mesa v. Killingsworth, 96 Ariz. 290, 294, 394 P.2d 410, 412 (1964) ("Where
the statute is unambiguous, the courts will only apply the language used and not interpret,
for the statute speaks for itself. "); Hunt v. Montgomery County, 248 Md. 403, 414, 237 A.2d
35, 41 (1968) ("If the words of a statute, given their normal meaning, are plain and sensible
the legislature will be presumed to have meant the meaning the words import."); Snow's
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been the target of frequent criticism by legal scholars.' A treatise on
statutory construction refers to the rule as a kind of verbal table-
thumping used to bolster an interpretation already reached on other
grounds.5 Other observers have found the rule to be generally useless
and impossible to apply.' In Pennsylvania, the "plain-meaning"
rule has been enacted into statutory form.7
The trouble with the "plain-meaning" rule is the very thing that
created the need for rules of interpretation in the first place-its
words must be interpreted. The legislature's imperfectly expressed
statutory language places a burden on the judicial system to inter-
pret, as does the imperfectly expressed language of interpretive
rules such as the "plain-meaning" rule. The result is a wide variety
of approaches by courts to statutory interpretation. At times, deci-
sions reached under the guise of one rule of statutory interpretation
or another may completely fail to capture the legislative intent
which is, after all, the real purpose of the rules.8
THE Daugherty CASE
A recent case decided in the Pennsylvania Superior Court,
Daugherty v. Continental Can Co.,' although rendered moot sub-
stantively by subsequent statutory amendment, presents an excel-
lent example of the unsatisfactory results which can flow from a
strict reliance on the rules of interpretation. Daugherty involved an
interpretation of the Equal Pay Law.'0 One provision of this statute
is that an employer may not discriminate by paying employees of
one sex less than the employees of the opposite sex for comparable
Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Morgan, 80 Wash. 2d 283, 288, 494 P.2d 216, 219 (1972) ("[wlhere a
statute is plain, unambiguous and clear on its face, there is no room for construction.").
4. See, e.g., Lyman, The Absurdity and Repugnancy of the Plain Meaning Rule of
Interpretation, 3 MAN. L.J. 53 (1969); Nutting, The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes, 24
MINN. L. RRv. 509 (1940) [hereinafter cited as Nutting].
5. 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (4th ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as SANDS].
6. See, e.g., Horack, supra note 1, at 338; Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Rules of
Statutory Interpretation, 3 KAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1954); Zweigert & Puttfarken, Statutory
Interpretation-Civilian Style, 44 TuL. L. REv. 704, 712-13 (1970).
7. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1921(b) (Supp. 1974).
8. See CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1921(a) ( Supp. 1974).
9. 226 Pa. Super. 342, 313 A.2d 276 (1973).
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 336.1-.10 (1964).
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work." In order to comply with this provision, Continental Can
Company reduced the wages of certain male employees to the level
of female employees.' 2 Both the male and female employees affected
by the reduction filed actions in assumpsit in the Allegheny County
Court of Common Pleas.13 Because the lower court interpreted the
applicable provision of the Equal Pay Law to require only that the
wage rate of one sex could not be less than the wage rate of the
opposite sex for comparable work, it found that the employer had
complied with the statute and granted a compulsory nonsuit. 4 On
appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the nonsuit. 5
THE "PLAIN-MEANING" RULE
The cornerstone of the decision in Daugherty was the "plain-
meaning" rule. The Equal Pay Law, in the court's opinion, required
only that an employer not discriminate among employees by paying
any employee less than an employee of the opposite sex for work
under comparable conditions." Since the employees of both sexes
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 336.3 (1964), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 336.3
(Supp. 1974) provided:
No employer shall discriminate in any place of employment between employes on the
basis of sex by paying wages to any employe at a rate less than the rate at which he
pays wages to employes of the opposite sex for work under comparable conditions on
jobs the performance of which requires comparable skills, except where such payment
is made pursuant to a seniority training or merit increase system which does not
discriminate on the basis of sex.
12. In 1960, some female employees of the Continental Can Company in Washington
County brought suit to recover wages allegedly due them under the Women's Equal Pay Law,
Act of July 7, 1947, No. 544, §§ 1-7, [1947] Pa. Laws 1401 (corresponds to PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, §§ 336.1 - .10 (1964)). Defendant's preliminary objections were sustained on the basis
that the differential was provided for under a collective bargaining agreement between plain-
tiffs and defendant. Stollar v. Continental Can Co., 23 Pa. D. & C.2d 463 (C.P. Wash. Co.
1960). The decision was ultimately reversed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Stollar v.
Continental Can Co., 407 Pa. 264, 180 A.2d 71 (1962), and remanded for further proceedings.
This decision, upholding plaintiff's claim of wage discrimination, set the stage for Daugherty.
On the date Stoltar was argued before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the union
entered into an agreement with Continental discontinuing bonus plans and all-male classifi-
cations that duplicated female classifications. Thus, male employees in identical job classifi-
cations received the same lower rate of pay as their female counterparts.
13. Daugherty v. Continental Can Co., Nos. 2469-70 (C.P. Allegh. Co., April, 1963).
14. Record at 96A, Daugherty v. Continental Can Co., 226 Pa. Super. 342, 313 A.2d 276
(1973). Another court reached exactly the opposite result in earlier litigation involving the
same statute and defendant. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n of United States & Canada v. Conti-
nental Can Co., 43 Wash. Co. 61 (C.P. Pa. 1962).
15. Daugherty v. Continental Can Co., 226 Pa. Super. 342, 313 A.2d 276 (1973).
16. 226 Pa. Super. at 348, 313 A.2d at 279. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 336.8 (1964).
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were paid at the same rate after the wage reduction, the court con-
sidered Continental to be in compliance with the statute. The court,
in its view, could not examine the legislative purpose since such
inquiry is unnecessary unless the statute will bear more than one
meaning.'7 The court relied on the Pennsylvania version of the
"plain-meaning" rule that when the words are not ambiguous the
letter of a statute should not be disregarded under the pretext of
pursuing its spirit."
Invocation of the "plain-meaning" rule in Daugherty seems to be
precisely the kind of verbal table-thumping referred to previously. 9
The "plain-meaning" rule was never intended for use in a vacuum;
when used, it is usually in conjunction with some modifying rules.
In Pennsylvania, statutory language contained in the same section
as the "plain-meaning" rule states that the object of interpretation
of statutes is to assure that they carry out the intention of the
General Assembly. 0 Another section of the same statute contains
certain legislative presumptions-the legislature does not intend an
absurd result," and the legislature intends the entire statute to be
effective." The "plain -meaning" rule, when considered together
with these provisions, makes much better sense. Since words, by
themselves or strung together in sentence form, are never absolute
in meaning, at least some extrinsic factors must be considered be-
fore deciding a statute is free from ambiguity. 3 In making its deter-
mination of statutory plain meaning, the Daugherty court failed to
look beyond the printed words.
17. Philadelphia v. Schaller, 148 Pa. Super. 276, 281, 25 A.2d 406, 409 (1942). The court
in Daugherty appears to fluctuate between citations to the statutory expression of the
"plain-meaning" rule, CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1921(b) (Supp. 1974), and the many
expressions of this rule by courts which have been articulated both before and after its
enactment into statutory form. A reliance on the statutory form should be sufficient unless,
because of its inherent ambiguity, some extrinsic evidence of its purpose is required.
18. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1921(b) (Supp. 1974).
19. SANDS, supra note 5, at 49.
20. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1921(a) (Supp. 1974) states:
The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if
possible, to give effect to all its provisions.
21. Id. § 1922(1) states, "the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd,
impossible of execution or unreasonable."
22. Id. § 1922(2) states, "the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective
and certain."




One problem in deciding if a statute is "clear and free from all
ambiguity" is agreeing on a definition of ambiguity. The dictionary
defines the word "ambiguous" as "the condition of admitting two
or more meanings."24 One commentator was satisfied with this defi-
nition until he tried to define the meaning of "meaning."25 Another
commentator suggested that a statute is neither a literary text nor
a divine revelation, but rather a statement of a situation, or group
of possible events within a situation, and is inherently ambiguous. 6
Although to most people "ambiguous" suggests contradictory
meanings, the true meaning of the word is broader and covers any
two meanings, whether contradictory or not. When a situation or
group of events is described in a statute, there must be at least two
situations which fit the description. By that definition, every statute
is ambiguous.27 Nevertheless, the commentator felt that even
though statutes may be intrinsically ambiguous, it may still be
possible to find a "plain" statute, i.e., one whose meaning is clear.28
To cite authorities that courts must adhere to the plain language of
the statute is to ignore a basic fact-no language is completely
neutral, no set of words or phrases means the same thing when
articulated or interpreted by different individuals or groups. As
Holmes said, "A word is not a crystal .. "29
Following this line of reasoning, in Daugherty we are faced with
a statute which is not free from all ambiguity but which, even so, is
plain when taken in its broadest sense. The question may then be
posed whether the "plain-meaning" rule really means "free from all
ambiguity" or "plain"? If it means "free from all ambiguity," the
rule of construction is of no real value, for if we accept the commen-
24. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED (14th ed. 1961).
25. Nutting, supra note 4, states:
A word is ambiguous if it has two or more possible meanings. But what is meaning?
Immediately gloom descends once more. To formulate an adequate conception of
"meaning" for the purposes of statutory interpretation is a task of surprising difficulty.
Id. at 510.
26. Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 863, 868 (1930) [hereinafter cited
as Radin].
27. It has even been suggested that statutes are intentionally ambiguous so that, through
the use of words of broad generality, Congress can delegate power to the courts to legislate in
its behalf. Miller, Statutory Language and the Purposive Use of Ambiguity, 42 VA. L. RED.
23 (1956).
28. Radin, supra note 26, at 868.
29. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
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tator's hypothesis, no statute is free from all ambiguity; there is,
therefore, no statute whose letter cannot be disregarded in favor of
pursuing its spirit. This line of reasoning brings us back to the same
conclusion: the "plain-meaning" rule is useless unless read along
with other rules of interpretation which require the consideration of
at least some extrinsic factors to reach the meaning of a statute.'
LOOKING TO THE WHOLE STATUTE
Another rule .of statutory construction suggests that in order to
arrive at the real meaning of a legislative enactment, it is necessary
to take a broad general view of it to understand its purpose, scope
and object.3 In other words, the meaning should be extracted from
the whole statute. Part of the problem with the Equal Pay Law is
what it leaves unsaid-it says nothing about initial compliance.
Since the legislature must have known that at least some employers
were not in compliance with the statute, it must have expected that
wage adjustments would be made in some instances to effect com-
pliance. In the section of the law dealing with remedies for viola-
tions, it is significant that employees paid at the lower rate can
receive only damages and reimbursement for back wages. Nowhere
is an employer given the option to retroactively reduce the higher
paid employees' wage rates to eventually make them equal with the
lower paid employees. If, therefore, an employer is given no oppor-
tunity to retroactively reduce wages to compensate the lower paid
employees for violation of the Act, it seems unlikely that there was
an intent to permit prospective wage reductions in order to comply
with the statute. Since nothing was said about future compliance,
and the legislature should not be assumed to be blissfully ignorant
of this facet of the equal pay problem, the section on remedies
provides the only clue to the actual intent of the legislature. It
suggests, when a broad general view of the statute as a whole is
taken, that the legislature did not intend that wage rates would be
lowered by this statute.
30. If the rule is, in fact, to be interpreted as "plain," rather than "free from all ambigu-
ity," then the problem becomes that of determining what is "plain." While some might
stubbornly insist that they "know it when they see it," most would concede that a plain
meaning is extracted from a set of words with the help of some extrinsic factors, which leaves
us at exactly the same point-the "plain-meaning" rule is useless without resort to compan-
ion rules and/or extrinsic materials.
31. CoNsoL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1922(2) (Supp. 1974) states "the General Assembly
intends the entire statute to be effective and certain."
Vol. 13: 639
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PRESUMPTION AGAINST ABSURD AND UNREASONABLE RESULTS
It is a presumption in ascertaining legislative intent that the legis-
lature did not intend absurd and unreasonable results.32 A statute
should be interpreted to preclude such a possibility. This presump-
tion, however, was ignored in Daugherty. What more absurd and
unreasonable result can be imagined than to require an employer (in
a hypothetical situation) to pay back wages and liquidated damages
under the Equal Pay Law to a group of employees against whom it
has discriminated and then to allow that employer to reduce the
wages of both groups of employees to the former wage rate of the
lower paid group? Such a construction would be permitted under
the court's interpretation. While the court repeated several times
that the Equal Pay Law is not a minimum wage provision,3 it could
hardly be argued that it was intended that employers use it as a tool
to reduce wages whenever the opportunity might arise.
CHANGE IN STATUTORY LANGUAGE
In order to enhance the decision arrived at by invoking the "plain-
meaning" rule, the court looked to a 1968 amendment to the Equal
Pay Law containing language nearly identical to a federal statute's
provision preventing an employer from lowering wage rates to com-
ply with the statute. 4 The court noted that a material change in the
language of an act always indicates a legislative intent to change
legal rights, 3 and a radical change in phraseology is a legislative
32. Heinlein v. Allegheny County, 374 Pa. 496, 503, 98 A.2d 36, 40 (1953); the statutory
version of the rule states "the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd,
impossible of execution or unreasonable." CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1922(2) (Supp.
1974).
33. 226 Pa. Super. at 350, 313 A.2d at 280. The court used the minimum wage example
to demonstrate its narrow construction of the purpose of the Equal Pay Law.
34. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, § 336.3(a) (Supp. 1974). Both provisions prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex by
paying lower wages to employees of the opposite sex for comparable work. Exceptions are
made for seniority and merit systems, systems which measure earnings by quantity or quality
of production, and for differentials based on any factor other than sex. Both contain the
following critical language:
Provided, That any employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this
subsection shall not [,] in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection,
reduce the wage rate of any employee.
35. See, e.g., Fidelity Trust Co. v. Kirk, 344 Pa. 455, 458, 25 A.2d 825, 827 (1942); Com-
monwealth v. Lowe Coal Co., 296 Pa. 359, 366, 145 A. 916, 919 (1929); Ogilvie's Estate, 291
Pa. 326, 333, 139 A. 826, 828 (1927).
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declaration that the law as amended did not previously embrace the
amending provision." Because a provision prohibiting wage reduc-
tions was added after the commencement of this action, the court
concluded that, prior to the enactment of the amendment, compli-
ance through reduction of wages was permissible.
There are many reasons for legislative additions to statutory lan-
guage, and a complete change of legislative intent is only one of
them. The court does not discuss whether "change" in the language
of a statute must necessarily include an "addition." "Change" im-
plies some language in existence to be changed; nonexistent lan-
guage cannot be changed. If the applicable case law had spoken of
a "change" in the statute itself, the addition of language could be
considered such a change; since it speaks instead of a "change" in
statutory language, that change cannot be made on a nonexistent
compliance provision.
An "addition" to a statute may not so conclusively indicate a
change in legislative intent. Even if it can be agreed that changes
to existing statutory language indicate a change in legislative in-
tent, it does not seem quite so clear that language omitted from an
earlier version of a statute was omitted intentionally. The addition
of language previously omitted could mean several things: (1) the
legislature sought to clarify, by adding words, a meaning it always
intended; (2) the legislature wished to cover a situation it did not
previously foresee; or (3) the legislature did in fact wish to add
something it intentionally omitted from the original enactment. If
the last alternative is the case, it might be asked why the legislature
did not articulate its intent more specifically.37 If either of the first
two alternatives applies, the implication is stronger that the intent
in the original enactment was in agreement with the amending pro-
vision. In Daugherty it seems far more likely that the intent in the
original enactment with respect to the lowering of wage rates to
comply with the statute was the same as the intent expressly stated
in the amending provision. The court's argument to the contrary is
36. See, e.g., MacFarland v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 158 Pa. Super.
418, 423, 45 A.2d 423, 426 (1946).
37. If the legislature had a specific intent to proscribe or permit a certain important
activity, such as the lowering of wages, it is more likely to have referred to that activity in
specific language. The addition of statutory language is better explained by the legislature's
recognition of an omission or of a need to clarify existing language.
Vol. 13: 639
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not convincing. It cites material from legal encyclopedias 8 to sup-
port its statement on change in statutory language, when one of the
very same references states qualifying language: (1) "the presump-
tion of an intention to change the law falls . . . when the amend-
ment is made to express more clearly the original legislative in-
tent";39 (2) even "an amendment making a statute directly applica-
ble to a particular case [such as Daugherty] is not a conclusive
admission by the legislature that the statute did not originally cover
such a case. .. ."40 An amendment may, in fact, be adopted be-
cause it is a better expression of a provision in the original enact-
ment.'
WHAT THE LEGISLATURE MIGHT HAVE SAID
While speculation on how the legislature might have written a
statute could be a dangerous pastime, it serves to illustrate the
elusiveness of meaning, and makes us less likely to passively accept
what appears to be a plain meaning. Some inferences as to the
legislature's state of mind might be drawn by comparing the lan-
guage it actually used in the statute with the language it might have
used. The critical phrase could have been worded, "No employer
shall discriminate . . . by paying wages to any employee at a rate
higher than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the
opposite sex . . . ." Instead the statute reads "lower."' 2 The sug-
gested wording of the statute still requires equal wages and yet,
when read together, the actual and suggested passages provide en-
tirely different inferences. In the statute as actually written there
appears to be an implication that an upward adjustment of the
lower wage rate is desired, while the suggested language implies a
downward adjustment of the higher wage rate.
WHERE LANGUAGE Is NOT "PLAIN"
Before rejecting inferences as to legislative purpose, the court in
38. 59 C.J. Statutes § 647, at 1097 (1932). "So a change of phraseology from that of the
original act will raise the presumption that a change of meaning was also intended .
39. Id. at 1098.
40. Id.
41. E.g., Fahey v. City Council, 208 Cal. App. 2d 667, 25 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1962) (landowners
in a proceeding to terminate certain assessments, tried unsuccessfully to show that an amend-
ment to an applicable statute meant that the statute's meaning had changed); SANDs, supra
note 5, at 224.
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 336.3(a) (Supp. 1974).
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Daugherty noted the emphasis placed by appellants on possible
goals of the Equal Pay Law: (1) to end wage discrimination against
female employees; (2) to improve the financial status of female
employees; (3) to strengthen employment security of male employ-
ees faced with replacement by lower paid female employees; and (4)
to improve the financial condition of male employees who would
accept lower wages in the face of replacement by lower paid female
employees. 3 Inspecting these goals, the court pointed out that since
the means of compliance with the statute are not specified, it could
not add "a requirement which the legislature did not see fit to
include."4
The court seemed somewhat uncomfortable in its reliance on the
"plain-meaning" rule and made an effort to justify its result by
looking at some aspects of legislative intent which, because it found
the statute plain on its face, the court had already decided were
unnecessary to examine. The primary purpose of the statute, in the
court's opinion, was to bar wage discrimination based on sex-not
to require a minimum wage. The court found nothing in the Equal
Pay Law indicating a legislative intention to duplicate the women's
minimum wage laws which Pennsylvania has had in effect in some
form since 1937.11
The court suggested that its interpretation of the Equal Pay Law
as it read at the commencement of the action would leave employers
with some flexibility in the event that the employer is financially
unable to raise the wages of those against whom it has discrimi-
nated." The court cited a Pennsylvania official's testimony before
a congressional subcommittee conducting hearings on proposed fed-
43. 226 Pa. Super. at 346-47, 313 A.2d at 278, citing Stollar v. Continental Can Co., 407
Pa. 264, 180 A.2d (1962); Op. AT'v GEN., 22 Pa. D. & C.2d 299 (1960), from which the court
inferred that only the minimum wage statute prevented employers from reducing wages to
comply with the Equal Pay Law. An interpretation of the analogous 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)
(1970) is provided in Shultz v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 420 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969).
44. 226 Pa. Super. at 348, 313 A.2d at 279, citing Commonwealth v. Reick Inv. Corp., 419
Pa. 52, 60, 213 A.2d 277, 282 (1965). In citing this passage the court repeated a theme which
has reverberated through a long line of Pennsylvania cases. E.g., Hochgertel v. Canada Dry
Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963), overruled on other grounds, Salvador v. Atlantic Steel
Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974); Olyphant Borough School Dist. v. American
Surety Co., 322 Pa. 22, 184 A. 758 (1936).
45. 226 Pa. Super. at 350, 313 A.2d at 280; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 333.101 (Supp. 1974);
Id. § 331 (1964).
46. 226 Pa. Super. at 350, 313 A.2d at 280.
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eral equal pay legislation. 7 She stated that it would be difficult to
secure compliance when large numbers of workers are affected and
when the wage differential is significant. The difficulty is com-
pounded when large corporations having facilities in several states
can threaten to shift production from one state to another. The cited
testimony, coming as it did from a Pennsylvania administrative
official in connection with pending federal legislation, seems to be
a rather tenuous basis for an inference of legislative intent in a state
statute. Flexibility, if that were a desirable and necessary feature
of the statute, could have been specifically incorporated by the leg-
islature or, if necessary, supplied by courts through a judicious in-
terpretation using established rules of construction." If reference to
the legislative history of the federal equal pay law is relevant to the
possible legislative purpose of the Pennsylvania Equal Pay
Law-and the Daugherty court by its citation of the official's testi-
mony apparently found it to be so-the congressional desire to avoid
depressed wages and living standards is evidence of legislative in-
tent to raise the wages of the lower paid employees." The United
States Supreme Court recently examined the legislative history of
the federal equal pay law and found that one company could not
cure its violations except by raising the wages of lower paid female
employees to the higher rate paid to male employees for the s~me
work.50
OTHER INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RULE
Other courts have taken a more enlightened approach to the
"plain-meaning" rule. While acknowledging the importance of the
letter of the law, they have recognized that the literal language need
47. Hearings on H.R. 898 & H.R. 10,266 Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1962).
48. The court, if it is to be consistent in its interpretation of statutes through the use of
the "plain-meaning" rule, will not allow wage reductions in the future under the amended
statute, thus destroying the flexibility it found so attractive in the unamended statute.
49. See Historical Note to 29 U.S.C.A. § 206 (1970) which states the following
congressional declaration of policy:
(a) The Congress hereby finds that the existence in industries engaged in com-
merce or in the production of goods for commerce of wage differentials based on sex-
(1) depresses wages and living standards for employees necessary for their
health and efficiency;. ..
50. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 206 (1974).
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not be followed if it would lead to unjust, absurd, or unreasonable
consequences inconsistent with general legislative intent.5'
Probably the most often cited example of such cases is Holy Trin-
ity Church v. United States,52 in which a statute made it unlawful
for anyone to prepay an alien's transportation into the United
States to perform labor of any kind under contract.53 The Holy
Trinity Church contracted with an alien residing in England to
come to the United States to serve as its pastor. There could be no
clearer violation of the literal words of the statute, yet the Supreme
Court found that the intent of Congress was not to include such a
contract within the statute. 4 In Mortensen v. United States,5 5 peti-
tioners, husband and wife, operated a house of prostitution in Ne-
braska. They went on a vacation trip to Utah, taking with them two
girls who had been employed at their house as prostitutes. Upon
their return, the girls resumed their prostitution activities at peti-
tioners' house. Petitioners were convicted under the Mann Act,
which declared quite clearly that any person who should transport
a woman across state lines for the purpose of prostitution or to
engage in any immoral practice should be guilty of a felony. 6 In
spite of such unequivocal language, the Supreme Court reversed the
conviction as inconsistent with the purpose of the act.57
51. See, e.g., Lincoln Am. Corp. v. Victory Life Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 112 (D. Kan. 1974)
(stockholder obtained a list of stockholders in spite of statutory provision to the contrary);
C. v. C., 320 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1974) (newspaper was refused access to the court file in a
divorce action despite apparently contrary statutory language); Chaffin v. Nicosia, 310
N.E.2d 867 (Ind. 1974) (plaintiff recovered for injury not discovered until after expiration of
medical malpractice statute of limitations); Christopher Inc. v. Joy, 44 App. Div. 2d 417, 355
N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (landlord sought and received relief from a clear but apparently
unjust provision in a rent statute).
52. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
53. Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332.
54. 143 U.S. at 459.
[W]e cannot think Congress intended to denounce with penalties a transaction like
that in the present case. It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of
the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the
intention of its makers.
Id.
55. 322 U.S. 369 (1944).
56. White Slave Traffic Act, Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825.
57. The Court stated:
To punish those who transport inmates of a house of prostitution on an innocent
vacation trip in no way related to the practice of their commercial vice is consistent
neither with the purpose nor with the language of the Act.
322 U.S. at 377.
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Some Pennsylvania courts have followed these cases.5" In Western
Pennsylvania Hospital v. Lichliter,5 it was held that a hospital was
not an industry under the Labor Anti-Injunction Act of 1937.60
While it was conceded that the statutory language was broad
enough to include the operations of a hospital, the court, citing Holy
Trinity, felt that the legislature did not intend such a result.6 ' More
recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that a court may
look beyond the letter of the law to interpret a statute in accordance
with legislative intent to avoid an absurd and harsh result.62 Such
an approach seems entirely reasonable and more nearly in accord
with a reading of all provisions of the Pennsylvania statute dealing
with statutory construction. 3
CONCLUSION
It seems quite clear from the foregoing that the Daugherty court,
had it chosen to look beyond the printed page to the circumstances
surrounding enactment of the statute, could have reached the op-
posite result. Certainly there have been many other courts, in Penn-
sylvania and elsewhere, which did not allow themselves to be so
obstructed by a literal adherence to rules of construction as to be
unable to reach a satisfactory result. 4
58. Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 285, 154 A.2d 788, 789 (1959). The court held that a
statute of limitations requiring an action to be brought within two years of the injury did not
preclude an action brought when a sponge was found in an incision more than two years after
an operation.
59. 340 Pa. 382, 386, 17 A.2d 206, 209 (1941).
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 206(c) (1964).
61. The court declared:
[Elven though the words used might conceivably be broad enough to include a hospi-
tal, nevertheless, a hospital is not within the spirit of the Act, and not being within
the spirit, the Act does not apply to it. That this is so, is shown by the much cited
case of Holy Trinity Church v. United States ....
340 Pa. at 387, 17 A.2d at 209.
62. Secretary of Revenue v. John's Vending Corp., 453 Pa. 488, 494, 309 A.2d 358, 362
(1973). The case involved a statute preventing one convicted of a crime of moral turpitude
from obtaining a cigarette vending license. The court held that the statute, in spite of its
wording, could not prevent appellant from obtaining a license even though he had been
convicted of such crimes some twenty years earlier.
63. CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 1921-39 (Supp. 1974).
64. See, e.g., Lincoln Am. Corp. v. Victory Life Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 112 (D. Kan. 1974);
C. v. C., 320 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1974); Chaffin v. Nicosia, 310 N.E.2d 867 (Ind. 1974);
Christopher Inc. v. Joy, 44 App. Div. 2d 417, 355 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Ayers v.
Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 285, 154 A.2d 788, 789 (1959).
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It is perhaps to be expected that results such as the one reached
in Daugherty will continue to emerge occasionally as long as the
rules of construction remain and are misinterpreted and misused
along with the statutory language they are designed to unravel. One
commentator noted that it cannot reasonably be hoped that a uni-
fied and clear system of statutory interpretation will be adopted
because the vague terminology in rules of construction is so conse-
crated that a juristic revolution will be required to destroy them. 5
The court is often denied the opportunity to take what he called a
"statesmanlike view" of a statute based on the imputation of sover-
eignty to the legislature. The sovereignty concept may be mis-
placed. There is no reason why administrators and judges cannot
serve as statesmen in much the same manner as the members of the
legislature even though the "statesmanlike" view is more definitely
a characteristic of the legislature. A statute is an exercise of states-
manship, and the legislature could, if it found the means to do so,
foreclose any attempt by another branch to circumvent its intended
purpose. If the legislature does not do so, the court should be free
to exercise its judgment." The Pennsylvania Superior Court in
Daugherty chose not to embark on a "juristic revolution" and adopt
a "statesmanlike view."
In spite of the array of judicial precedent and statutory enact-
ments in support of the court's rationale, it is not at all clear that
the Daugherty decision is consistent with legislative purpose or pub-
lic expectations. Legislatures, no matter how mightily they may
strive, will never cover foreseen, much less unforeseen, situations by
perfectly expressing their intent. Courts, by self-imposed rules
sometimes (as in Pennsylvania) recorded in statutory form, often
refuse to look beyond this imperfectly expressed statutory language
to reach the intent of the legislature. In so doing, they must ignore
their own perception of statutory purpose as well. Yet on certain
occasions courts will shake free of their self-administered shackles
and render a decision based on the statutory purpose as they per-
ceive it and as they conclude that the legislature perceived it. In
Daugherty there appears to have been an opportunity for just such
a burst of creative, constructive statutory interpretation, but the
court chose to pass it by. Consequently, the court contributed little
65. Radin, supra note 26, at 885.
66. Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 H~Av. L. REv. 388, 411 (1942).
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or nothing to the development of a more satisfactory approach to the
problem of statutory interpretation.
Richard Hall Potter

